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CONVENTION

MargaretL. Tomlinson*
Good morning. Today is Friday the 13th. I have often thought that
the Law of the Sea Treaty was born under the sign of Friday the 13th, if
there is such a thing. Actually the unlucky day we are facing at the
moment happens to be this coming Monday, November 16, at which time
we stand to lose our provisional membership in the institutions created
under the 1994 Agreement which, in effect, amended the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, and enabled the United States to sign it, and send it to the
Senate for its advice and consent, where it languishes still.
According to the program, this panel is to discuss accomplishments
since the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. My fellow panelists are indeed
expert in the evolution of various institutions which have emerged from
that Convention, and in a number of interesting current issues in the
development of ocean law such as piracy and terrorism, environmental
agreements, and conflicts between jurisdictional claims and navigational
freedoms such as those that have erupted in the South China Sea, the
Taiwan Straits, and elsewhere.
All of these developments arise from, or build upon, the Law of the
Sea Treaty which was the beginning, not the end, of a continuing effort to
build a rule of law in the world's oceans in the face of multiple uses and
conflicting claims. I thought my role might be to set the stage for others
on the panel by running through a quick historical overview of the long and
torturous history of the negotiation of the Law of the Sea Convention. I do
this with some trepidation before such an audience of experts in
international law. But I have found that, except among people who follow
this issue closely, the mention of the 1982 Convention elicits responses like
those of the blind man and the elephant. What you touch is what you see.
And because there is so much misunderstanding of what in fact this treaty
is about I would like to review the whole, even if in very broad outline.
First a few basic facts. The Law of the Sea Convention entered into
force in November of 1994 with the requisite sixty ratifications and after
heroic efforts by the United States and others to achieve changes in the part
of the 1982 Convention dealing with seabed mining, which would enable
the United States to sign the treaty. These changes were embodied in what
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is known as the Agreement, adopted at a special session of the United
Nations General Assembly in July of 1994, at which time the United States
The Law of the Sea
signed the Agreement and the Convention.
Convention has now been ratified by 127 states (there are several more in
process which may by now be complete).
These states included all
members of the European community, except, I believe, Belgium, the
Russian Federation, China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, and
so on around the world.
If some opponents of this treaty once believed that the United States
should make selective bilateral or regional arrangements with like minded
states, that option no longer exists. We are either a part of this now
virtually universal treaty or we stand outside as an observer, as all of these
related institutions and rules, which other members of this panel will talk
about, begin to take shape.
While assessing these new institutions I think it is important to keep in
mind that the treaty has not been ratified in the four years since it was sent
to the Senate, and indeed there has not even been a hearing in the Foreign
Relations Committee because of the opposition of its chairman, Senator
Helms. This despite the fact that the United States, which arguably had the
most at stake in the successful outcome of this negotiation, worked to that
end on a bipartisan basis through three different administrations of both
parties to achieve such an outcome; and still later, the Bush and Clinton
administrations set forth and obtained changes which were essential to the
United States' support and ratification of the treaty.
Does it matter? After all, some argue, we have gotten along so far
without being a party to this Treaty. Well, yes, it does matter. Apart from
all the specific problems that may arise from our status as an observer
rather than a state party, what really matters most is the constriction of
American leadership in a rapidly evolving construct of international law,
and one which is here to stay, and one which continues to touch vital
interests of the United States.
The overarching reason for American support for a universal treaty
has been to preserve navigational freedoms in which we have a
fundamental strategic interest, and to that end, to contain and rationalize
claims of jurisdiction over offshore waters which, in the late sixties, were
escalating rapidly. Those territorial claims threatened to overlap strategic
waterways and straits around the world and, in effect, to subject navigation
in the most important and often confined transit routes of the world's
oceans to a regime of innocent passage at best. And while the American
concern at the time was, and still is, to preserve naval and air mobility and
flexibility - a strategic interest not shared by many other nations - it is
interesting to me that as the global economy grows, more and more nations
and more and more companies engaged in international trade are becoming
aware that freedom of the seas and assured access to navigation routes is
also vital to commercial shipping which carries a vast percentage of world
trade.
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In the 1970's the effort, under the aegis of the United Nations, to
create a universal treaty, was not undertaken without trepidation as to our
ability to protect our vital interests in such a diverse forum. And, in fact,
in the late sixties the United States was engaged in some discussions with a
few other countries with a view to further defining the 1958 and 1961
Geneva Conventions with respect to offshore claims. That effort to deal
with specific issues came to an end when there was set forth in the United
Nations General Assembly a vision of vast wealth from the mineral
resources of the deep seabed which would provide a solution to the
financial problems of developing countries if they were assured a share of
this wealth. Hence the evolution of the so-called package deal in a treaty
which would accommodate navigation and coastal resource interests would
be negotiated in tandem with a regime protecting access for all to the hoped
for riches of the common heritage of the deep oceans. Such a regime
however, did have to deal fairly with certain economic requirements which
in the end it failed to do, and thus, in 1982 the United States did not sign
the treaty despite the remarkably successful achievement of all of our
objectives with respect to navigation and coastal resource rights.
The issue of seabed mining has colored perceptions of this treaty ever
since. But the reality is that the limitations on the extent of territorial sea
to twelve miles, the protection of transit rights through and over and under
international straits and other traditional waterways, and the
accommodation of coastal state jurisdiction over economic resources in a
200 mile economic zone with preservation of traditional high seas freedoms
of navigation, was an extraordinary accomplishment in retrospect, and one
which was only possible because of vigorous American leadership. Had
we not taken on such a leadership role despite some concerns about the
nature of the forum, we would most surely have found ourselves now with
a thousand points of darkness threatening to hinder navigation.
Today, with strategic doctrines which emphasize rapid response and
deployment to areas of trouble in the world, those rights of transit, and the
accompanying rights of overflight, remain a vital interest of the
Department of Defense in the ratification of this treaty. The argument that
we can and would maintain our rights by force if necessary, ignores the
virtues of being on the side of universally accepted law when an issue
arises. Not that there will not be disputes, but the acceptance of a
framework of law has in most cases an inhibiting effect on flagrant
violations of accepted norms. It is far easier to engage in efforts to assure
compliance with accepted norms than it is to impose them by force. It is
also cheaper.
Furthermore, as the use of the oceans continue to expand, as they
have and will continue to do, it is not only the rules that are important but
compliance with the rules, and therefore, access to dispute settlement
procedures. These rules and procedures are already being designed. It is
very likely - one might say even a certainty - that if we fail to take a
leading role we will not like the results. There are a couple of current
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object lessons in the Outer Continental Shelf Commission and the Law of
the Sea Tribunal, both of which have come into being without official
participation by the United States, and both of which deal with issues of
concern to us.
Finally, in making the case for ratification it is necessary to deal with
the unfortunate problem still presented by what was known as Part XI, or
the seabed mining section of the treaty. I am reminded of the time, many
years later, that I asked the principal United States negotiator of the 1958
Geneva Conventions why the issue of jurisdiction over resources of the
continental shelf was left so vague. He said it was because we had no real
idea of what might be possible there. Would that the Law of the Sea
negotiators been as sensible, but this issue became an ideological mantra of
the new international economic order of the 1970s, as a tradeoff for the
navigation and coastal resource interests of developed countries. In the end
the result was unacceptable to us. Too many people are still unaware that
those provisions have been substantially and satisfactorily changed.
This came about in the late Eighties when it became evident that this
Treaty was getting close to coming into force with the requisite sixty
ratifications without the participation of any significant players, a result
which would benefit no one. The then Secretary General initiated a new
effort to see if and how the concerns of the United States and others could
be accommodated so that the treaty could become the universal framework
it was intended to be. First the Bush and then the succeeding Clinton
administrations, once again a bipartisan decision, took a quiet but vigorous
leadership role in negotiating the Agreement, officially known as "the 1994
Agreement Relating to Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea."
That Agreement specifically addressed, and resolved to the satisfaction
of the American negotiators, the six specific objections that the Reagan
administration had set forth in declining to sign the treaty in 1982, and
provided a permanent seat and a de facto veto for the United States in the
Council of the International Seabed Authority - a position we keep until
Monday after which our status is problematic because of our failure to
ratify the treaty within the four year framework that was established for
participation on an interim basis by states which had signed but not yet
ratified. Presumably this time frame can be extended by agreement of the
states parties.
In essence, the Agreement substitutes for the original Part XI in every
instance where its provisions are in conflict. And while one. might wish
that none of this structure be put in place until such time as seabed mining
becomes a reality, a circumstance far more remote in time now than was
anticipated in the 1970's, the fact is that it is a workable piece of a whole
which is far more important. Unfortunately, the public and political
perception of this treaty, to the extent there still is one, is that it is all some
third world concoction about seabed mining.
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It is, of course, a little embarrassing, as well it should be, that the
United States having insisted upon, and obtained, every one of its specified
fixes to Part XI has now failed even to conduct a hearing on the whole
treaty. But embarrassment is bearable and hopefully temporary; and alas,
not all that unusual a fate of treaties in the Senate. What is less bearable
and far less defensible is a prospective failure of the United States to
continue its leadership role in this truly global evolution of law of the
oceans. When the cat's away is not an inappropriate analogy here.
This is an audience which, far more than most, understands that
international law is not a fiction, and that the U.S. role in building it is one
of great consequence both to our own country and to the strength of the
international system we have done so much to create.
To use the current cliche, "we are the worlds only remaining
superpower." To the extent that our interests are threatened anywhere in
the world we will take appropriate action to defend them. We do not know
how that role will evolve in the next century. What we do know is that
man's move into the oceans is continuing. What we also know now,
because of the ratification of this treaty by all the other significant members
of the international community, is that the Law of the Sea Convention will
be the framework for the evolution of ocean law whether we are its leader
or not.
Whatever may have been the merits of arguments in the past for
bilateral negotiations, or some other alternative to a universal convention,
those options no longer exist. It is difficult to conceive of any reason why
the United States should not ratify this treaty, and do it now. As the
members of this panel talk about new institutions and emerging problems,
keep in mind that we may be a three hundred pound gorilla observing the
proceedings, but an observer is what our status is. It is not one worthy of
what we have at stake.
Thank you.

